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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
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WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES UNDER
THE MISSOURI CODE
EARL T. CRAWFORDt
Among the procedural devices now available to a litigant in
Missouri by which he may obtain from his opponent the dis-
closure of pertinent and material facts in the latter's possession
prior to trial, will be found one which, although not original, is
comparatively new so far as this state is concerned. Its imme-
diate ancestor is one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'
which, in the main, embodies the substance of former Equity
Rule 58.2 Its remote ancestor, on the other hand, probably can
be traced to the equity bill of discovery in the English Chancery
Practice,3 as the present device is obviously a further extension
of the idea that discovery is often essential to the proper conduct
of litigation. In fact, this method of compulsory disclosure has
tMember, Missouri and Kansas Bars.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 33. For this reason frequent decisions of the federal
courts have been cited as indicative of the probable decisions of the Missouri
Courts.
2. 27 MAROq L. REV. 158 (1943). See also State ex rel. Williams v. Buzard,
354 Mo. 719, 190 S.W.2d 907 (1945), -where the court said:
F.R. 33 did not come full grown out of the sky; it is derived from
former Equity Rule 58, 28 U.S.C.A., Sec. 723, Appendix, which had its
basis in the bill of discovery practice of chancery. As shown by the
above authorities, its purposes were well known and its use was to find
out what the opponent knew of his own knowledge which the other
party could use as evidence.
Id. at 725, 190 SW.2d at 909.
3. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). For the classical equity pro-
cedure, see LANGDELL, EQUITY PLEADING §§ 56-58, 68-79, 171-175, 215 (1883)
passim. For the modern developments of discovery prior to the present
federal rules, see RAGLAND, DiscovERY BEFOR TRIAL (1932). See also
James, Discovery, 38 YALE L.J. 746 (1929); Millar, The Mechanism of
Fact Discovery, 32 ILL. L. Rsv. 424 (1937) ; Sunderland, Scope and Method
of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863 (1936); Note, 18 KAN. CIY
L. REv. 70 (1950); Note, 16 Mo. L. REv. 45 (1951).
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sometimes been referred to as a "cheap bill of discovery."' Basi-
cally, however, it is simply a procedural device by which a party
to a suit may serve upon an adverse party written interroga-
tories, to be answered, as will appear more fully hereafter, by
the latter under oath and whether the action is one at law or
in equity.,
GENERAL NATURE OF INTERROGATORIES
These written interrogatories which are served upon the
adverse party, and the answers too, for that matter, are not
to be considered a part of the pleadings in any case in which
they are used.7 They are, on the contrary, in the words of the
state supreme court, only "a less formal and less expensive way
of ascertaining facts [in advance of trial] than by depositions."18
They are, according to another Missouri court, "a part of the
process of discovery of evidence before trial,'" 9 and any admis-
missions as to facts obtained may be offered in evidence at the
trial against the party making them.10 And the state supreme
court has further declared, in this connection, that interroga-
tories may be used to obtain details of matters which are alleged
only in generalities in the pleadings and to narrow the issues
as to matters formally denied in the pleadings but not actually
disputed in order to save time and expense." Or more specifi-
4. O'Reilly, Discovery Against the United States: A New Aspect of
Sovereign Immunity?, 21 N.C.L. REV. 5 (1942).
5. See the discussion concerning the answers, which is supported by notes
75- 106 infra.
6. Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.020 (1949). In this connection, note also the
statutory provisions which permit the taking of depositions by requiring a
witness to answer written interrogatories annexed to a commission issued
by a court of record in this state and directed to some person or officer in
another state. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 428.220-492.260 (1949).
7. Dunleer Co. v. Minter Homes Corp., 33 F. Supp. 242 (S.D.W. Va. 1940).
8. State ex Tel. Williams v. Buzard, 354 Mo. 719, 726, 190 SW.2d 907,
910 (1945). See also Belding v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 205 SW2d
866 (Mo. App. 1945). It was said in Onofrio v. American Beauty Macaroni
Co., 11 F.R.D. 181 (W.D. Mo. 1951), that interrogatories differ from depo-
sitions in that the information sought on the former does not presuppose
or contemplate details of evidence and that the purpose of interrogatories
is to seek an admission or obtain information of major importance.
9. State ex Tel. Jensen v. Sestric, 216 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo. App. 1948).
10. State ex rel. Williams v. Buzard, 354 Mo. 719, 190 S.W.2d 907 (1945).
For a statement that interrogatories are not to be used as a device or
stratagem to maneuver the adverse party into an unfavorable tactical
position, see Onofrio v. American Beauty Macaroni Co., 11 F.R.D. 181
(W.D. Mo. 1951).
11. Ibid.
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cally, according to this court in a later case' 2 in which the pro-
priety of several individual interrogatories was involved, dis-
covery may be used for three distinct purposes: (1) to narrow
the issues in order that at the trial it may be necessary to pro-
duce evidence only as to a residue of matters which are found
to be actually disputed and controverted; (2) to obtain evidence
for use at the trial; and (3) to secure information as to the
existence of evidence that may be used at the trial and to as-
certain how and from whom it may be procured, as for instance,
the existence, custody and location of pertinent documents, or
names and addresses of persons having knowledge of relevant
facts.
THE RIGHT TO FILE
The right to file interrogatories as well as to require them to
be answered is to be found solely within the language of the
code, and the section relating to the use of this procedural de-
vice explicitly provides that any party to the suit may file written
interrogatories upon an adverse party, although it must be noted
that no party can, without first obtaining leave of court, file more
than one set to be answered by the same party. 3 Thus, it will
be seen that no litigant is barred from the use of interrogatories
unless the party upon whom he desires to serve them is not an
adverse party within the meaning of that term as used in the
statute. 4
Moreover, so far as the first set of interrogatories to be
answered by the same party is concerned, the code does not pre-
scribe any step which must be taken as a condition precedent to
the right to file. The right is not, therefore, dependent upon a
party first obtaining leave of court, 5 although it has been else-
where indicated that leave of court must be obtained before
interrogatories can be filed after depositions have been taken on
the ground that such procedure is analogous to the filing of a
12. State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co., 356 Mo. 674, 203 S.W.2d
407 (1947).
13. Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.020 (1949).
14. In Harlan Produce Co. v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R.,
8 F.R.D. 104 (W.D.N.Y. 1948), it was held that if the pleadings reveal no
issue between two parties, they are not adverse parties. Cf. Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Tradesmens National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Charlton Steam Shipping Co., 3 F.R.D. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1944); C.F. Simonin's
Sons v. American Can Co., 26 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
15. United States v. United States Cartridge Co., 6 F.R.D. 352 (E.D. Mo.
1946).
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second set of interrogatories.' 8 But the language of the Missouri
code does not seem, even by implication, to prevent a party from
resorting to the use of interrogatories without leave of court
even where depositions have already been taken. In fact, there
is nothing in the code which would tend to bar a party from
using interrogatories after prior utilization of any other method
of discovery, or, for that matter, concurrently with any other
method.17
COURTS WHERE AVAILABLE
The right to use interrogatories is, by virtue of the language
relating to the general applicability of the code of 1943, limited
to "the supreme court, courts of appeal, circuit courts and com-
mon pleas courts."' 8 It is, therefore, obviois that this particular
provision of the code does not permit the use of interrogatories
either in the magistrate court"" or in the probate court. Nor, on'
the other hand, does the language of the specific section dealing
with the use of interrogatories indicate that it applies to any
other than a trial court as distinguished from an appellate court.
TIME TO FILE
Nor does the code of civil procedure prescribe when the inter-
rogatories shall be filed. As a result, the question arises whether
it would be proper to file interrogatories along with the petition
and serve a copy with the copy of the petition upon the defendant
or whether the plaintiff is required to wait until service of pro-
cess has been had upon the defendant or, perhaps, until after the
defendant has answered. If, however, the decisions pertaining
to the federal rules, prior to the amendment of Rule 33, when
the rule was similar to the Missouri code provision relating to
interrogatories, are to be accepted as indicative of the proper
16. McNally v. Simons, 1 F.R.D. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). But in Howard v.
United States Marine Corp., 1 F.R.D. 499 (S.D.N.Y 1940) and in Onofrio
v. American Beauty Macaroni Co., 11 F.R.D. 181 (W.D. Ro. 1951), it was
said that the right to propound interrogatories is subject to judicial dis-
cretion. In C.F. Simonin's Sons v. American Can Co., 30 F. Supp. 901, 903(E.D. Pa. 1939), the court said: "Thus it appears that the court must
either grant discovery whenever it is asked for, provided a cause of action
has been pleaded, or look for an earnest of the plaintiff's good faith some-
where other than in the complaint."
17. See, however, Currier v. Currier, 3 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) to the
effect that a plaintiff may not at the same time take depositions. Also note
Canuso v. City of Niagara Falls, 4 F.R.D. 362 (W.D.N.Y. 1945).
18. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 506.010 (1949).
19. State ex rel. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Blocher, 361 Mo. 1107, 238 S.W.2d
361 (1951) ; State ex rel. Jensen v. Sestric, 216 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. App. 1948).
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answer to the question, any filing before the plaintiff's petition
has been served would constitute a premature filing. Indeed,
these decisions indicate that this would be true if the interroga-
tories were filed at any time prior to the joinder of issues2°--a
view supported by the obvious fact that until the pleadings are
filed, it is impossible to anticipate the matters which will be
unrevealed, or denied, or even material to the suit and subject
to compulsory disclosure. Generally, therefore, would not the
better policy be to withhold the filing of interrogatories until
the issues are made up and the interrogator knows what matters
ought to be disclosed?2 1 But this does not mean that the plead-
ings may not be amended after the disclosure of new facts or
that the pleadings must be in final form for trial before inter-
rogatories can be filed. In other words, where an issue is made
by the original pleadings filed in the case, it would undoubtedly
be proper for a party thereafter to file written interrogatories
no matter how the pleadings afterwards might be altered or
amended.
FORM AND NUMBER OF QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED
All interrogatories must be in writing and addressed to the
adverse party.22 The code contains no other requirement as to
form. Nor is there any express statutory limitation as to the
number of individual questions which may be included in the
set served upon the adverse party, although this does not mean
that the interrogatories should be overly repetitious and, as
will appear more fully hereafter, irrelevant, or ambiguous, or
vague, or too general, or inclusive.2 3 In fact, the observation
20. Thus, in Sheldon v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 2 F.D.R. 272 (W.D.
N.Y. 1942), it was held that a motion for leave to file interrogatories was
necessary if such interrogatories were to be filed before the service of an
answer. To same effect, see Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Home
Indemnity Co., 6 F.R.D. 218 (S.D. Cal. 1946), where defendant was not
required to answer interrogatories filed before answer, except by leave of
court. Also see Musher Foundation v. Alba Trading Company, 42 F. Supp.
281 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). See, however, McHenry v. Erie R.R., 9 F.R.D. 554(N.D. Ohio 1949), to the effect that, with the 1948 amendment to Rule 33,
interrogatories may be served on the other party without leave of court
within ten days after the commencement of the action.
21. See, in this connection, Mo. REV. STAT. § 509.100 (1949), relating to
the effect of a failure to deny averments in a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is required.
22. Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.020 (1949). That they should not be addressed
to the attorney or agent of the adverse party as this device is limited to
the parties in litigation, see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
23. Auer v. Hershey Creamery Co., 1 F.R.D. 14 (D.N.J. 1939). That
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has been made with reference to this device for forcing discovery
under the federal rules that "the number of interrogatories
should be relatively few and related to the important facts of
the case rather than very numerous and concerned with rela-
tively minor evidential details. ' 24 The reason for this limitation
has been said to be that otherwise written interrogatories might
well develop into a most burdensome provision and a litigant
could put his adversary to unreasonable expense by propounding
needless and excessive questions25 and thereby actually contra-
vene the provisions of the Fifth Amendment, prior to an adjudi-
cation of liability, by requiring a party to incur expense greater
than that ordinarily incident to the prosecution or defense of
a suit.28
In spite of the foregoing, however, it is hereby submitted
that, while interrogatories should, of course, be confined to the
relevant issues of the case, if the device is to be really effective
and a less formal and less costly method of determining facts be-
fore trial than by taking depositions, the court should not be too
much concerned with the number of individual interrogatories
nor generally with the labor and cost to the opposing party.27
interrogatories should be simple, direct and certain and the interrogated
party not required to speculate upon the legal or factual significance of
the interrogatories, see Caskey & Young, Some Limitations upon Rule 33
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 VA. L. Rgv. 348 (1942). That
there should be a direct causal relation between the subject matter of the
interrogatories and the issues raised by the pleadings, see Slydell v. Capital
Transit Co., 1 F.R.D. 15 (D.D.C. 1939). Also note Melnerney v. Win. P.McDonald Const. Co., 28 F. Supp. 557, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
24. Coca Cola Co. v. Dixie Cola Laboratories, 30 F. Supp. 275, 279 (D.
Md. 1939) ; Knox v. Alter, 2 F.R.D. 337 (W.D. Pa. 1942). Also note State
ex rel. Williams v. Buzard, 354 Mo. 719, 728, 190 S.W.2d 907, 912 (1945).
It has been said that oral depositions are superior to written interroga-
tories since the interrogated party will usually, with the assistance of
counsel, answer leisurely and consequently will have a better chance to
avoid giving the information sought than when examined orally and that
consequently to avoid this effect, the interrogatories become numerous and
complex and the cost of answering them often out of proportion to the
facts actually elicited. Sutherland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before
Trial, 42 YALn L.J. 863 (1933).
25. Caskey & Young, supra note 23, at 348.
26. Byers Theaters v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D. 286 (W.D. Va. 1940).
27. See Adelman v. Nordberg, 6 F.R.D. 383 (E.D. Wis. 1947), where it
was held that the labor of preparing the answers to interrogatories con-
stituted no objection since it would be necessary for the defendant to do a
large part of the work anyway in preparing for trial. In Canuso v. City of
Niagara Falls, 4 F.R.D. 362 (W.D.N.Y. 1945), it was said that the guide by
which to determine whether interrogatories should be answered is not the
number of interrogatories propounded but rather whether they are reason-
able questions in the particular case. In J. Schoeneman, Inc. v. Brauer, 1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss1/5
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Perhaps the proper view to take is that it makes no difference
how many interrogatories are posed. If the inquiries are perti-
nent, the opposing party cannot object. Yet, upon a motion for
a rehearing in the first case to be appealed to it involving this
method of discovery, the state supreme court held that, if the
interrogatories are too complicated and involved and seek to go
in detail into controversial evidentiary matters, the court should
sustain objections to them on that ground. The reason for this
decision was that otherwise too great a burden would be placed
on the defendant in matters that could better be developed in
depositions. "The spirit of the new code," said the court in its
written opinion, "is to allow essential information admissible
in evidence, to be obtained by the less expensive method of inter-
rogatories whenever that is reasonable and proper."28 And it
might well be added that the court ought not subject the indi-
vidual interrogatories to too strict an interpretation as to mere
form and the like lest the spirit of the code be violated and the
use of interrogatories become a futile formality.2
SCOPE--IN GENERAL
Anglo-Saxon courts have always had a discernible tendency to
restrict the use of the principle of discovery. Thus, in 1795, a
litigant made an unsuccessful attempt to use an amended bill
in equity as a "fishing bill," to quote from the language of the
court, in order to compel his opponent to reveal "in what manner
he is heir ex parte patern and all the particulars ... of the
births, baptisms, marriages, deaths or burials, of all the persons,
who shall be therein named."' ' A similar attitude relative to the
use of discovery generally was expressed in his work on equity
jurisprudence by Story, to wit: a party may not pry into the title
of his opponent.31 Even in recent years, this tendency to restrict
F.R.D. 292 (W.D. Mo. 1940), it was said that an unlimited number of
written interrogatories may be propounded if the inquiries are pertinent.
28. State ex rel. Williams v. Buzard, 354 Mo. 719, 728, 190 S.W.2d 907,
912 (1945).
29. Aktiebolaget Vargos v. Clark, 8 F.R.D. 635 (D.D.C. 1949).
30. Ivy v. Kekewick, 2 Ves. 679, 30 Eng. Rep. 839 (1795). In that case
it was further stated by Lord Chancellor Loughborough: "This is a fishing
bill to know how a man makes out his title as heir. He is to make it out:
but he has no business to tell the plaintiff how he is to make it out." Ibid.
That under the common law, a party was not entitled to know before trial
the tenor of evidence in his opponent's possession, see M4cCarthy v. Palmer,
29 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
31. In Downie v. Nettleton, 61 Conn. 593, 24 At. 977 (1892), Story's
view was quoted: "Nor has a party a right to any discovery, except of
Washington University Open Scholarship
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has continued. For instance, in the state of Washington where
a statute permitted "interrogatories for the discovery of facts
and documents material to the support or defense of an ac-
tion,112 the court refused to require the defendant, in a case
where interrogatories were filed, to answer any question which
went into the defendant's defense on the ground that the statute
did "not enable him to pry into the opposite party's case.13 3 And
some federal courts also took the view with reference to the
former equity rule that interrogatories would not permit a party
to go into his opponent's case or defense.3 4 Nor was this ten-
dency to restrict the use of interrogatories completely checked
by the new rules of federal procedure as some of the district
courts unhesitatingly took the view that, despite the new rules,
discovery may not be used by one litigant as a vehicle through
which he can make use of his opponent's preparation of his case.35
There is, however, today an obvious general tendency, at least
facts and deeds, and writings necessary to his own title, or under which he
claims; for he is not at liberty to pry into the title of his adverse party."
Id. at 596, 24 Atl. at 978.
32. WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1226 (Remington 1932).
33. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Lotta Miles Tire Co., 139 Wash. 159,
162, 245 Pac. 921, 922 (1926). In New York, the courts hold that the
plaintiff may examine the defendant as to matters essential to the main-
tenance of the cause of action, Mendelsohn v. Mendelsohn, 259 App. Div.
379, 19 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1st Dep't. 1940), and to the issues of which he has
the burden of proof, Brookwood Parks, Inc. v. Jackson, 261 App. Div. 410,
26 N.Y.S.2d.127 (3d Dep't. 1941), and that the defendant may examine the
plaintiff relative to matters essential to the defense, Ainsworth v. Cooper
Underwear Co., 227 App. Div. 837, 237 N.Y. Supp. 301 (4th Dep't. 1929),
and to issues which he must prove, Zeltner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Md., 220 App. Div. 21, 220 N.Y. Supp. 356 (1st Dep t. 1927). In other
words, a party may not ordinarily examine his adversary as to matters
which the latter must prove. Goldberg v. Hommel, 250 App. Div. 870, 295
N.Y. Supp. 157 (2d Dep't. 1937).
34. J. H. Day Co. v. Mountain City Milling Co., 225 Fed. 622 (E.D. Tenn.
1915). But cf. Texas Company v. Gulf Refining Co., 12 F.2d 317 (S.D.
Tex. 1926).
35. In Hercules Powder Co. v. Robm, 3 F.R.D. 328 (D. Del. 1944), it
was said:
Moreover, interrogatories 4 (c) and 4 (d) in referring to "each com-
pound" seek to have plaintiff make research and compilation of data
which defendant may equally make to itself. In effect, the questions
have a tendency to peek into plaintiff's preparation for trial. A de-
fendant is not entitled to information as to discoveries or results made
by a plaintiff in its preparation for trial.
Id. at 330.
In McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1939), the court said:
To use them in such a manner would penalize the diligent and place a
premium on laziness. It is fair to assume that, except "in the most
unusual circumstances, no such result was intended.
Id. at 586.
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so far as the federal rules are concerned, to subject the rules
relating to discovery to an interpretation which formerly would
undoubtedly have fallen within the ban of a "fishing expedi-
tion."36 This tendency is evident from the language of the Su-
preme Court of the United States in the historic case of Hickman
v. Taylor"7 that "[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To
that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever
facts he has in his possession." 3 In line with this reasoning a
federal district court has said that "fishing expeditions" by
means of interrogatories are permissible since it is more desi-
rable to allow discovery of immaterial facts than to deny dis-
covery which may bring to light facts which are more material
to the issues than any facts theretofore known.39
The present Missouri Code of Civil Procedure, however, ac-
cording to a pronouncement of the state supreme court, does not
"authorize discovery of matters not admissible in evidence even
though such matters might aid in the preparation for trial." °
In accordance with that rationale "the production of documents
or copies of them either in court, or on deposition, or on inter-
rogatories, which are incompetent and immaterial and not ger-
mane to the subject matter of the suit" cannot be required.1
The right of discovery, said the court, unlike that under the
federal rules, "does not depend upon whether the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence." 42
36. For holdings to the effect that facts relating to the adversary's case
may be disgorged by discovery, see United States v. General Motors Corp.,
2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D. Ill. 1942); R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Decca Records, Inc., 1
F.R.D. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Nicholas v. Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. 908
(D. Mass. 1938).
37. In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), it was said: "No longer
can the time honored cry of fishing expedition serve to preclude a party
from going into the facts underlying his opponent's case." Id. at 507. And
see Pike & Wills, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 297,
303 (1949), to the effect that the fact that discovery is mutual-that while
a party may have to disclose his case, he can at the same time tie his
opponent down to a definite position-annihilates the "fishing expedition"
objection.
38. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
39. Reed v. Swift & Co., 11 F.R.D. 273 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
40. State ex rel. Thompson v. Harris, 355 Mo. 176, 180, 195 S.W.2d 645,
647, 648 (1946).
41. Id. at 180, 195 S.W.2d at 647. See also Belding v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., 205 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App. 1947).
42. Ibid. For a similar view, see Caskey & Young, supra note 23, at 355,
where it is said:
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In fact, the state supreme court went even further in its con-
demnation of discovery of matters in aid of preparation for trial
than above indicated when in a later case it condemned an inter-
rogatory because it called "both for subjective purposes and for
intra-company instructions given to relator's agents about the
preparation of its defense. ' 43 In so concluding the court held that
under the present code the principle expressed in Hickman .
Taylor,"' that it was not proper to require the disclosure of the
thoughts, mental processes, and work product of lawyers in the
preparation of a case, also extended and applied to such prepara-
tion by parties and their adjusters or investigators. And while
the court is undoubtedly right in so limiting the scope of dis-
covery, the usefulness of interrogatories as a method of dis-
covery would have been greatly enhanced had the courts of
Missouri also so construed the statute that a party could compel
Although designed to inform each party of as much as possible of his
adversary's claim, interrogatories were not meant to impose upon one
party the burden of preparing his opponent's case.... The outcome of
litigation is dependent upon proof. The strength of a litigant's position
is determined by the extent to which he can establish his allegations
by proof. Certainly, it is not incumbent upon one party to prove his
opponent's case.
43. State ex rel. Millers Mutual Fire Ins. Ass'n. v. Caruthers, 360 Mo. 8,
12, 226 S.W.2d 711, 713 (1950).
44. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Court expressed its opinion as follows:
In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer
work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intru-
sion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a
client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he con-
siders to be relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal
theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference.
That is the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act
within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promotejustice and to promote their client's interest. This work is reflected, of
course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs,
mental impressions, personal beliefs and countless other tangible and
intangible ways-aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals in this case [153 F.2d 212, 223 (1945) J as the "work product
of the lawyer." Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere
demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain un-
written. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be
his own:...
We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained and pre-
pared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation are
necessarily free from discovery.... Where relevant and non-privileged
facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those
facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may
properly be had. Such written statements and documents might, under
certain circumstances, be admissible in evidence or give clues as to the
existence or location of relevant facts. Or they might be useful for
purposes of impeachment or corroboration.
Id at 510, 511.
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an adversary to disgorge whatever facts he had in his possession,
if not irrelevant or privileged, which would either constitute
competent evidence or would reasonably and likely lead to the
discovery of evidence of this character. It is unfortunate that
the Missouri courts have rejected the apparently broader view
of the Supreme Court of the United States that "either party
may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession," 45 unless it can be shown that the examination is
being conducted in bad faith and in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the person subjected to the inquiry or that
the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the
recognized domains of privilege. 6
So long as the sought-for information is pertinent and rele-
vant and admissible in evidence, the fact that such information
is already within the present knowledge of the propounder of
the interrogatories, does not bar discovery of the information. 47
Interrogatories may be propounded with reference to matters
with which the interrogator is already familiar,48 or is in as good
a position to know or find out the desired information as is the
adverse party.49 In other words, a party may properly seek facts
pertaining to his opponent's case regardless of whether such
facts are exclusively or peculiarly within the latter's knowledge
45. Id. at 507.
46. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Also see Checker Cab
Manufacturing Corp. v. Checker Taxi Co., 2 F.R.D. 547 (D. Mass. 1943).
In Balazs v. Anderson, 77 F. Supp. 612 (N.D. Ohio 1948), it was said that
the office of interrogatories is not to supply information for the "personal"
use of the litigants. In United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 7 F.R.D. 193
(D.C. Del. 1947), the court stated that relevancy does not depend upon
admissibility as evidence in the case but refers to the subject matter of
the suit.
47. Bowles v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 4 F.R.D. 469 (W.D. Mo. 1945);
Kingsway Press, Inc. v. Farrell Publishing Corp., 30 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y.
1939). In Quirk v. Quirk, 259 Fed. 597 (S.D. Cal. 1919), the court said:
"It makes no difference whether the facts are as much within the knowledge
of the plaintiff as of the defendant. The facts have to be proven, and if
the plaintiff can get an admission from the defendant, it saves the necessity
of proving the facts, except by such admission of the defendant." Id. at 598.
But see Earp Thomas Farmogerm Co. v. Stimuplant Laboratories, 38 F.2d
691 (E.D.N.Y. 1930), where the following statement was made: "A dis-
covery relates to the unknown, not the known. The defendants are pre-
sumed to know what their own acts and the acts of their employees are.
Therefore, why need they be, and indeed how can they be, the subject of
discovery?" Id. at 692.
48. Snyder v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 7 F.R.D. 738 (W.D.
Mo. 1948).
49. Patterson Oil Terminals, Inc. v. Charles Kurz & Co., 7 F.R.D. 250(E.D. Pa. 1945).
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or whether the former has at his disposal an adequate or even
a better source of information relative to them."0 A federal
district court, however, once concluded that if the answer to the
plaintiff's interrogatory could add nothing to what the plaintiff
already knew, the objection made by the defendant to the inter-
rogatory should be sustained.5 1
Actual immediate possession of pertinent and relevant facts
which constitute admissible evidence, however, is not always
necessary in order that disclosures may be compelled by one's
opponent in a law suit. The power or right to control is equiva-
lent to the possession of material facts. Similarly, disclosure
may not be avoided by a party if he can with reasonable inquiry
or diligence ascertain the facts of which he has actual or con-
structive control, as it is the ability to disclose, rather than the
immediate knowledge of the facts subject to disclosure, that
determines the matters which must be revealed. Nevertheless,
ordinarily, a party may not be compelled to engage in research
or make an extensive investigation or compilation of data and
of information not readily known to him. 2
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
There is some indication in a decision of the state supreme
court that interrogatories might be utilized to obtain documents
or copies of them if they are competent evidence and material
and germane to the subject matter of the suit.53 This should be
the ultimate and definite position so far as the Missouri code is
concerned, although the statement has been made regarding
the interrogatory provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure that the proper procedure is to inquire whether certain
relevant documents are in the possession of an adversary and
then resort to the rule which provides for the production of docu-
50. Onofrio v. American Beauty Macaroni Co., 11 F.R.D. 181 (W.D.
Mo. 1951).
51. Dorman v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 6 F.R.D. 609 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
52. Onofrio v. American Beauty Macaroni Co., 11 F.R.D. 181 (W.D.
Mo. 1951); Snyder v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 7 F.R.D. 738
(W.D. Mo. 1948); accord, Colorado Milling and Elevator Co. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 11 F.R.D. 580 (W.D. Mo. 1951). But cf. R.C.A. Mfg. Co.
v. Decca Records, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), where the court ruled
that a party may not object to interrogatories on the ground that they
would require extensive research, investigation, and expense, if they relate
to details alleged in his pleading and concerning which he presumably has
information.
53. See note 40 supra.
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ments for inspection, copying and photographing, inasmuch
as the rule relating to interrogatories and the rule relating to
the production of documents are not alternative devices.54
OPINION EVIDENCE
There are indications in federal decisions that opinions should
not be sought by means of written interrogatories.- One reason
that has been advanced for this view is that a proper foundation
cannot be laid for opinions within the mechanics of this device
for discovery. Another is that conclusions from evidentiary
matters in the possession of an opponent should not be elicted by
means of interrogatories since conclusions based on such matters
are for the court or jury.56 Yet one will wonder, at least in some
instances, why a proper foundation cannot be laid for securing
an opinion from an adverse party, particularly if the opinion
could be obtained had depositions been used rather than written
interrogatories, inasmuch as the courts of Missouri hold that
the latter is simply a substitute for the former. Moreover, there
is no sensible argument against the fullest possible use of this
method or instrument of discovery in Missouri, and the courts
should be constrained to adopt this view when a party resorts
to written interrogatories to obtain disclosure of pertinent and
material matters.
HEARSAY
Since the right in this state to resort to interrogatories is
limited to the discovery of matters which are admissible in evi-
dence at the trial or hearing of the cause, any matter which
54. See Caskey and Young, supra, note 23, at 358, where it is stated:
Rule 33 was not intended as an alternative method of discovery....
One may certainly inquire whether certain relevant documents are in
the possession of an adversary. But a party may not be required to
summarize, restate or interpret his written contracts or agreements.
The proper procedure is adequately to designate those documents which
might contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action
and then move the court for an order allowing an inspection for the
purpose of copying or photographing.
See also Commentary, Obtaining Copies of Documents by Interrogatories,
10 FzD. RuLEs SERv. 1039 (1948).
55. Onofrio v. American Beauty Macaroni Co., 11 F.R.D. 181 (W.D. Mo.
1951); Snyder v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 7 F.R.D. 738 (W.D.
Mo. 1948); Byers Theatres v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D. 286 (W.D. Va. 1940). For
a statement to the effect that only matters of fact need be disclosed, see
Blanc v. Smith, 3 F.R.D. 182 (S.D. Iowa 1943).
56. Caskey & Young, supra, note 23 at 348. Also see Lenerts v. Rapidol
Distributing Corp., 3 F.R.D. 42 (N.D.N.Y. 1942).
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falls within the realm of hearsay need not, of course, be re-
vealed. 5T This was the supreme court's conclusion in one of the
first cases to be appealed to it where the use of interrogatories
under the new code was involved. There, the court held that
written statements which were obtained by a railroad company
from an injured motorist and the other occupants of the auto-
mobile several days after the collision were hearsay and conse-
quently inadmissible in evidence in a personal injury suit
brought by such motorist against the railroad.r8 Also, in har-
mony with the above general rule, the court held on another
occasion that it was improper to interrogate a corporate defen-
dant with regard fo whether any of defendant's employees had
obtained "the names and addresses of any persons present
at the time and place of the casualty" since such a question
sought information which the employees could have learned only
by hearsay.50 The question propounded should have been confined
to persons "known to have been present" by the employees
present. 0 A similar conclusion was subsequently reached in an-
other case, where the individual interrogatory asked for the
names of the persons questioned by defendant's agents, investi-
gators or adjusters after the fire which had caused the loss
allegedly covered by the plaintiff's policy, for the reason that the
interrogatory called for the names of persons whose connection
with the case and whose knowledge of facts connected therewith
could only have become known to its agents by hearsay.61
These decisions, however, do not mean that the names of mere
onlookers may not be obtained by the use of interrogatories. In
fact, the supreme court had announced in a case decided prior
to the rendition of any of the foregoing decisions that such a
view was "too restricted" when the defendant contended that the
names of persons having no part in the accident out of which
57. State ex. rel. Millers Mutual Fire Ins. Ass'n. v. Caruthers, 360 Mo. 8,
226 S.W.2d 711 (1950); State ex Tel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v.
Cowan, 356 Mo. 674, 203 S.W.2d 407 (1947); State ex rel. Thompson "v.
Harris, 355 Mo. 176, 195 S.W.2d 645 (1946). For a statement that a party
need not answer interrogatories which called for matters concerning which
such party had only hearsay information, See, Muth v. Fleming, 7 F.R.D.
537 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
58. State ex Tel. Thompson v. Harris, supra note 5.7.
59. State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Cowan, 356 Mo. 674,
678, 203 S.W.2d 407, 408 (1947).
60. Id. at 681, 203 S.W.2d at 410.
61. State ex rel. Millers Mutual Fire Ins. Ass'n. v. Caruthers, 360 Mo. 8,
226 SW.2d 711 (1950).
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the action arose would not be relevant or material to the issues.
"The situation here is not the same," said the court in re-
jecting the defendant's contention, as where a question calls
for "what an investigator found out from others long after
the occurrence. ' ' 62 In the latter event, continued the court in its
reasoning, the question clearly called for hearsay information.63
But where the question seeks to obtain from an employee of the
defendant, who was at the scene of the accident, the names of
persons whom he knew were present at the time because seen
there by him, such information, says the opinion of the court, is
not hearsay but is on the contrary a proper matter for inter-
rogation.
It has also been held that the plaintiff with propriety may ask
the agent of a corporate defendant for the names and addresses
of persons obtained by him who were present at the time and
place of the accident in addition to the names and addresses of
persons known by such agent to have been present.64 In reaching
this conclusion, the court declared that the mere fact that the
officer who answered for the defendant corporation concerning
the names and addresses of persons present would have to rely
on information obtained by other employees, rather than on
his own knowledge, did not render such interrogatories objec-
tionable as calling for hearsay. Said the court, in justifying its
decision:
.. .The interrogatories are addressed to parties and not to
individual witnesses who are not parties. As applied to a cor-
poration, it does not mean that the officer answering for
62. State ex rel. Williams v. Buzard, 354 Mo. 719, 726, 190 SW.2d 907,
910 (1945).
63. Ibid. The court in State ex rel. Williams v. Buzard, supra note 62,
quoted the following statement from the earlier case of State ex rel. Evans
v. Broaddus, 245 Mo. 123, 149 S.W. 473 (1912):
We have not before us at this time the question whether one eye-
witness may not be asked who the other eyewitnesses of an accident were.
That information might be useful in chief to identify and earmark
the transaction or in rebuttal.
Id. at 142, 149 S.W. at 478.
The court in State ex. rel. Williams v. Buzard, supra, then went on to assert:
Declarations of bystanders have been admitted as part of res gestae ...
Undoubtedly, it would be proper to ask defendant's operator (if his
deposition should be taken) to give the names of those he knew were
present at the casualty by being found by him there on the car at the
very time. If this is true,... then certainly it would be proper to re-
quire the same information to be given by the defendant on interrogatories.
State ex rel. Williams v. Buzard, 354 Mo. 719, 726, 190 S.W.2d 907,910 (1945).
64. State ex. rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Cowan, 356 Mo. 674,
203 S.W.2d 407 (1947).
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it must be competent to testify to the truth of facts, shown
by documentary evidence, such as required reports in its files
and records. He is answering for the corporation and not
for himself, as was likewise true on bills of discovery in
equity from which interrogatories to parties developed.-6
In an earlier case, however, it will be found that the court
had rejected a similar claim 6 6 There the corporate defendant
maintained that the operator who found the witnesses at the
very time of the casualty was not the person to answer the inter-
rogatories. Rather, it contended that the officer, director, or
managing agent of the defendant competent to testify should do
the answering and that therefore the question, which sought the
names and addresses of any other of defendant's employees
(aside from the operator) who were upon the street car at the
time and place of the casualty referred to in plaintiff's petition,.
would call for hearsay only. The court said in rejecting this
argument that it was erroneously assumed:
... that the only purpose of these interrogatories was to get
testimony of an officer, director or managing agent of de-
fendant. The interrogatories were not directed to them;
they were directed to the defendant, a corporation. Section
85, Mo.R.S.A. § 847.85(7), and Rule 3.19, authorized service
on one of them to notify the defendant, because a corpora-
tion has to be reached by service on some individual. Like-
wise, some individual must be responsible for making its
answer. Section 27 (c), Mo.R.S.A. § 847.27 (c) (18) author-
ized seivice on company officials to bring the defendant into
court in the first place, but no one would contend that such
individual served was sued or would have to pay a judgment
against the corporation. Of course, defendant's officers,
directors and managing agents do not operate its cars and
buses and most likely would not personally know anything
about the circumstances of any of its traffic accidents.-
65. Id. at 681, 203 SW.2d at 410 (1947).
66. State ex rel. Williams v. Buzard, 354 Mo. 719, 190 S.W.2d 907 (1945).
67. Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 510.020 (1949).
68. Mo. Ru. STAT. § 506.150 (1949).
69. The court further stated in State ex 'el. Williams v. Buzard, 354
Mo. 719, 190 S.W.2d 907 (1945):
Therefore, interrogatories to a corporate defendant cannot completely
take the place of depositions of its employees as a method of discovery.
The best way to find out the circumstances of such accidents would be
to take'the deposition of the operator, or of other eye-witnesses. That
would also be one way to find out the names of persons whom the
operator, knew were present at the casualty by reason of being found by
him there on the car at that very time.
Id. at 728, 190 S.W.2d at 911.
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Nevertheless, continued the court, even:
•.. the operator might have to refresh his memory [if his
deposition were taken] from the memorandum he made at
the time .. in order to fully answer the question. If he
had made such a memorandum and delivered it to a com-
pany official, and the company has it in its files, why should
not an officer of the company state the names shown on it
in answer to a proper question on interrogatories? Cer-
tainly the corporation knows the facts that are shown by
its records. ... plaintiff is entitled to this information...
and should be allowed to get it either from the operator on
a deposition or from defendant on interrogatories. Either
one or the other may obtain it or it may take both. If no
one can answer this question that is another matter; but
the fact would not determine whether or not the question
was proper.... Nevertheless, even when an officer does not
have personal knowledge gained at the scene of the casualty,
some proper questions may be asked and should be answered
if the information can be obtained from the company's
records.70
PRIVILEGED MATTERS
Unlike the statutory provision relating to the production of
documents, papers, tangible things, and the like where the right
to inspect, copy or photograph is expressly limited to things
"not privileged," ' the Missouri Code of Civil Procedure does not
explicitly bar the use of interrogatories as a means for dis-
covering privileged matters, such as those arising out of the
attorney-client, the physician-patient and the husband-wife rela-
tionships and the right to freedom from self-incrimination. But
despite the absence of a provision excluding the discovery of
privileged matters by means of written interrogatories, the rule
consistently followed by the Missouri courts that interrogatories
may not be used to disclose matters which will not be competent
evidence would seem in itself sufficient to compel the conclusion
that privileged matters may not be disgorged from an adverse
party.
Nor have the courts of this state to date in any reported de-
cision held that privileged matters are not subject to disclosure
by any of the discovery devices provided for under the present
code. Nevertheless, some indication of what the Missouri courts
will hold, at least so far as the attorney-client privilege is con-
70. Ibid.
71. Mo. REV. STAT., § 510.030 (1949).
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cerned, may be found in the case of Hiekman v. Takylor,1 2 which
has been partially approved by the state supreme court.73
This case, so far as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
at the time involved, clearly recognized that "the memoranda,
statements and mental impressions.., in this case fall outside
the scope of the attorney-client privilege and hence are not pro-
tected from discovery on that basis." 74 In so concluding, the
Supreme Court of the United States declared that "it suffices to
note that the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend
to information which an attorney secures from a witness while
acting for his client in anticipation of litigation. Nor does this
privilege concern the memoranda, briefs, communications and
other writings prepared by counsel for his own use in prose-
cuting his client's case; and it is equally unrelated to writings
which reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions or legal theories. ' '75 Yet it must be noted that the
Supreme Court, in its opinion, did not set forth the scope of the
attorney-client privilege. It simply recognized that, while the
general policy was against invading the privacy of an attorney's
course of preparation, such privacy was not wholly beyond the
scope of invasion, although the "burden rests on the one who
would invade that privacy to establish adequate reasons to justify
production through a subpoena or court order."78
But Hickman v. Taylor constitutes no authority for a court
to compel the disclosure of privileged matters. On the contrary,
it recognizes the right of the court to forbid such disclosures,
and it is hereby submitted that any matter which falls within
72. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
73. State ex TeL. Millers Mutual Fire Ins. Ass'n. v. Caruthers, 360 Mo. 8,
226 S.W.2d 711 (1950).
74. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
75. Ibid.
76. Id. at 512. The Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, supra, also
stated:
Here is simply an attempt, without purported necessity or justification,
to secure written statements, private memoranda and the personal
recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the
-ourse of his legal duties. As such, it falls outside the arena of dis-
covery and contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly prose-
cution and defense of legal claims. Not even the most liberal of dis-
covery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and
mental impressions of an attorney.
Id. at 510.
... If there should be a rare situation justifying production of these
matters, petitioner's case is not of that type.
Id. at 513.
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the scope of any of the recognized privileges, ought not be
ordered disclosed upon objection of the party interrogated. This
is the view which the courts of this state should take as there
is no reason why a litigant should be permitted to utilize inter-
rogatories to violate any of the existing privileges such as that
of attorney-client or doctor-patient or freedom from self-incrimi-
nation." Even the most liberal interpretation of the interroga-
tory statute would not warrant a violation of these privileges
over the objection of the party subjected to interrogation.
TRADE SECRETS
Is it fair to require the disclosure of trade secrets to an ad-
verse party by means of the various devices of discovery includ-
ing interrogatories?" The answer to this question is not ap-
parent on the face of the statute relating to the use of inter-
rogatories, but, in a recent Missouri decision,79 the judge who
wrote a separate concurring opinion took the .view that, despite
the severe nature of the procedure to compel disclosure, not only
must the ingredients of a washing compound be disclosed to the
propounder of the interrogatories but that the proportions of
such ingredients must also be disclosed, as "such is apparently
the plain meaning" of the statute and "it is the duty of this
court to enforce the law, as laid down by the legislature, even
though such law may seem harsh to us."80 And the courts in its
opinion stated that it knew of "no law that prevents a court from
compelling the divulging of a trade secret under circumstances
where it is as material as here in ascertaining the facts."''
77. See Marsh v. Marsh, 16 N.J. Eq. 391 (Ch. 1863), where an inter-
rogatory was held "demurrable" on the ground that the defendant in a
divorce action was not obliged to accuse herself of a crime (adultery). Also
see Note, 52 A.L.R. 143 (1928).
78. See Putney v. Du Bois Co., 226 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. App. 1950). Also
note Bead Chain Manufacturing Co. v. Smith, 1 N.J. 118, 62 A.2d 215(1948). In Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, 10 F.R.D. 477 (W.D. Mo. 1950),
where the ultimate fact issue was whether the plaintiff was injured by the
ingredients of a suntan lotion, such ingredients were relevant to the issue
in the case, and the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to discovery
thereof by interrogatories but not to the secret formula.
79. Putney v. Du Bois Co., 226 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. App. 1950).
80. See, id. at 743 (concurring opinion).
81. Id. at 741. In Coca-Cola Co. v. Joseph C. Wirthman Drug Co., 48
F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1931), the court, in discussing the right to withhold such
information, said:
Except where there is some announced reason of public policy-such
as incrimination or privileged communication-the rules of evidence
have never bent to permit a party to a suit to refrain from divulging
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Nevertheless, the court recognized that it would be difficult
to formulate ptecisely the state of the law on the problem. It
did, however, conclude that the law recognizes no absolute privi-
lege for trade secrets and that "the mere divulging of the in-
gredients of a compound and the proportionate part of each,
would not in our opinion, be divulging a secret process."8 - And
in this connection, it is interesting to note that the court also
concluded that it would do no good to divulge the information
secretly to the judge or even to the plaintiff after the trial had
started and after the plaintiff had otherwise failed to prove a
causal relation between her injury and the compound that plain-
tiff had alleged had caused such injury, inasmuch as "to keep
from her this information would prevent her from making a
prima facie case." 83 In other words, the court seemed to feel that
if evidence is admitted during the trial of a case, it must really
be admitted and, if the case is one being tried before a jury, sub-
mitted to them for their consideration the same as any other
evidence introduced by the parties in support of their pleadings.
THE ANSWERS
The interrogatories which are served upon the adverse party
must be answered by him, except where the adverse party is a
public or private corporation or partnership or association. In
this latter event, in the language of the statute, the questions are
to be answered "by any officer, director, partner or managing
agent thereof competent to testify"18 4 in behalf of such corpora-
tion, partnership or association. The supreme court, however,
has by a rule declared that the interrogatory statute "shall be
facts pertinent to the issues before the court simply because he might
be injured by such facts becoming public. In saying this, we do not
wish to be understood as meaning that under any and all circumstances,
where secret trade formulas or trade secrets might have a bearing upon
issues before a court, they must be revealed. As far as is consistent
wvith fair administration of justice, such secrets should be protected.
But -where such hold the essential facts of a controversy and no equally
good evidence is obtainable, we see no reason why they should not be
required.
Id. at 748.
82. Id. at 742.
83. Id. at 741. For further discussion of the view that privacy might be
-preserved to a large degree by compelling disclosure no further than to thejudge himself, or to his delegated master or auditor, see 8 WIGMORE,
EvIDENCE § 2212 -(3d ed. 1940).
84. Mo. te. STAT. § 510.020 (1949).
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construed to permit the service of interrogatories upon, and to
require answer to the same by, a party, or, if the party served
is a public or private corporation, or a partnership or associa-
tion, a designated officer, director, general manager or managing
agent thereof."'8 5 This obviously means that the party serving
the interrogatories may designate the exact officer that he wants
to make the answers. Yet, no matter who answers, the answers
must be in writing and under oath, and each question must be
answered separately. The answers must also be signed and
sworn to by the person making them.86
But if an "officer, director, general manager or managing
agent" of a corporation or association is to make the answers to
the propounded interrogatories, must he, in view of the statutory
requirement that he be "competent to testify in its behalf," be
competent in the sense that he can actually take the witness
stand in the case and give competent and relevant testimony,
before he is qualified to answer the interrogatories served? The
conclusion, that he must be competent in this sense, was con-
firmed to some extent by the state supreme court when it held
in a damage suit that the agent for a street car company need
not answer an interrogatory which called for hearsay informa-
tion: the names of any persons which any employee of the com-
pany may have found at the scene of the casualty later or iden-
tified with it by hearsay.87 Yet despite this holding, in the main,
the expression has been liberally interpreted, even in the afore-
mentioned suit which excluded the disclosure of names of persons
learned by hearsay to have been present, when the court also
held that an officer of a corporation, although he had no personal
knowledge gained at the place of the accident, could be properly
interrogated if the information for making an answer could be
obtained from the corporation's records, or perhaps by the
85. Mo. Sup. CT. RuLE 3.19. If interrogatories are answered by a person
on behalf of a corporate defendant who is not a person competent to testify
in behalf of such defendant, but who was designated by the plaintiff to
answer, the plaintiff is estopped to deny his authority to speak for the
corporation. See Holler v. General Motors, 3 F.R.D. 296 (E.D. Mo. 1944).
86. MO. REV. STAT. § 510.020 (1949). Also see Pitman v. Florida Citrus
Exchange, 2 F.R.D. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), where the answers were signed
and verified by the attorney of a corporate defendant.
87. The question involved was: "Please state the names and addresses of
all persons whose names and addresses were taken by any employee of
your corporation at the scene of the casualty?" State ex rel. Williams v.
Buzard, 854 Mo. 719, 723, 190 S.W.2d 907, 908 (1945).
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officer from some other agent of the corporation who possessed
such information and who had not acquired it by the process
of prohibited hearsay but rather in the performance of his duties
for the company.' While the case does not specifically hold that
the court may compel disclosure by an officer of information
which he has acquired or can easily acquire from another agent
of the corporation, it is not contrary to the spirit of the case to
conclude that this is the proper view."8 After all, a corporation
can only act through its agents and the knowledge of the agent
is the knowledge of the corporation, and any agent who falls
within the scope of the language, "officer, director, general man-
ager or managing agent" and who can secure the information
possessed by the corporation should be required to disclose it
when sought by appropriate interrogatories. Any other view
would bar the use of interrogatories in many cases involving
corporations and associations.
It should also be noted, in connection with the competency as
a witness as a qualification for the party who shall answer the
interrogatories, that the statute does not lay down the same
requirement for individuals who are parties that it does for
corporations, partnerships and associations. If the party is not
a corporation, partnership of association, such party must per-
sonally answer the served interrogatories, and there is no pro-
vision in the statute that the party must be competent to testify
in the case although the rule that only relevant, material and
competent evidence need be revealed in answer to written inter-
rogatories would tend to require that such party also be a com-
petent witness. Yet it could well be that a case might arise
where the party was not a competent witness. Should this pre-
88. In 2 MooRE, FEDSRAL PRAcTIdE § 33.04 (1st ed. 1938), it is stated:
Under Federal Rule 33, a party may without leave of court serve
interrogatories to be answered by an officer of a public or private
corporation, partnership or association which is an adverse party. The
party serving the interrogatories may designate therein a particular
officer whom he desires to answer the interrogatories or may leave it with
the adverse party to select an officer to make the answers. Since only one
set of interrogatories may be served on an adverse party without leave
of court; the party serving the interrogatories, if he is not satisfied with
the answers of a particular officer, must obtain leave of court to serve
another set of interrogatories to be answered by another officer. It
would seem, however, that a party may without leave of court serve
one set of interrogatories to be answered by such officer or officers that
have requisite knowledge to make answers thereto. In such a situation,
it would seem that one officer may make the answers, obtaining the
information from other officers.
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vent the use of interrogatories? Here, as in the case of an officer
answering for a corporation, if the information sought can be
easily obtained by the party-if such information is really under
his control or in his possession-such party ought to be required
to answer. So to extend the use of written interrogatories seems
in harmony with the general spirit of the Missouri code, although
the problem would doubtlessly often arise for the court to deter-
mine whether hearsay information was actually being sought,
should the interrogatories not be answered where the informa-
tion could be obtained from another person.
From the foregoing, and as elsewhere stated, it is apparent as
a general rule that any interrogatory which is relevant and
competent as evidence in the cause must be answered, unless
the answer would tend to violate a privilege or incriminate the
person interrogated, or force him to express an opinion, a con-
clusion or urge a contention. 9 And there is no indication in the
statute that the court has any discretion so far as determining
whether a proper interrogatory must be answered, for it would
seem that a party who files interrogatories has an absolute right
to have them answered by the adverse party and that the latter
is bound to .answer them under possible penalty of a default
judgment in the case, unless the questions are objected to, as
hereafter pointed out, and the objections sustained.90 If a ques-
tion is proper, there seems to be no basis for the exercise of
judicial discretion in the matter. Yet one of the appellate courts
of this state concluded in a case involving a trade secret that
whether an interrogatory which sought the disclosure of the in-
gredients of a washing compound should have been answered
"was a matter within the sound discretion of the learned trial
court. '91 The suggestion, however, is hereby made that perhaps
the fact that the case involved a trade secret accounted for this
conclusion of the-court-a fact rather obvious from language
contained in the court's opinion. But be that as it may, the
federal courts have sometimes declared that the court has a
reasonable discretion in deciding whether or not a plaintiff is
entitled to have interrogatories answered.9 2
89. Landry v. O'Hara Vessels, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 423 (D. Mass. 1939).
90. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 510.060 (3) (1949).
91. Putney v. Du Bois Co., 226 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Mo. App. 1950).
92. See, e.g., Newell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 144 F.2d 338 (10th Cir.
1944); C. F. Simonins Sons v. American Can Co., 30 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa.
1939).
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Moreover, the party upon whom the interrogatories shall
have been served shall not only file his answers with the clerk
of the court but is required also to serve a copy of the answers
upon the party who submitted the interrogatories and to do so
within fifteen days after the delivery or service of the inter-
rogatories upon the party required to answer, unless the court,
on motion and notice and for good cause shown, shall either
shorten or enlarge the time .3 But is the answering party re-
quired to serve a copy of his answers upon any other party in
the case? The code is silent in this respect, and the import of
the statutory language seems to be that if there be more than
one adverse party, the statute does not require service of a copy
of the answers upon any other party than the one by whom
the interrogatories were propounded.
Furthermore, if the propounded interrogatories are to be
answered, each question should be answered directly and without
evasion in the light of the information which the party inter-
rogated possesses or can ascertain with due inquiry. They
should be answered "fully," to use an expression found in the
statute. 15 This means that the answers must be complete, 0 al-
though, as elsewhere pointed out,97 the party answering is not
required generally to engage in research or compile extensive
information and data which is not readily known or available
to him98 or which will entail great or burdensome expense. It
also means that if an answer is not complete, the adverse party
may move the court for an order requiring the party who has
not answered properly to further answer"' or subject himself
to the penalties provided for wilful failure to respond to pro-
pounded interrogatories.
93. Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.020 (1949).
94. See Gaumond v. Spector Motor Service, 1 F.R.D. 364 (D. Mass. 1940).
95. Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.020 (1949).
96. See Lowe v. Greyhound Corp., 25 F. Supp. 643 (D. Mass. 1938),
where the answer ended with the word "etc."
97. See text supported by note 48 supra.
98. Hercules Powder Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 3 F.R.D. 328 (D. Del.
1944). Also see Stanley Works v. C. S. Mersick & Co., 1 F.R.D. 43 (D. Conn.
1940), to the effect that a party may not be put to the trouble and expense
of taking photographs although an existing photograph may be obtained
by the use of interrogatories.
99. Kiernan v. Johnson-March Corp., 7 F.R.D. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1945).
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FAILURE AND REFUSAL TO ANSWER
The party who files interrogatories to be answered by his
opponent is entitled to have each individual interrogatory an-
swered unless the court, after proper objection, holds that the
unanswered interrogatory is improper. In order to compel the
party upon whom interrogatories have been filed to answer, the
present code of civil procedure provides that "the proponent of
the question may move the court, on reasonable notice to all
persons affected thereby, for an order compelling an answer."'100
If the motion is granted, and if the court finds that the refusal
was without substantial justification, the court is empowered to
require and "shall require the refusing party to pay to the
examining party, the amount of the court costs incurred in ob-
taining the motion."1' Conversely, if the motion is denied and
if the court finds that the motion was made without substantial
justification, it shall require the examining party to pay to the
refusing party the amount of the court costs incurred in opposing
the motion. 102
Not only may the court compel the refusing party to pay the
court costs incurred in connection with the motion to force a
party to answer an interrogatory which such party has refused
to answer, but the court is further authorized by specific statu-
tory mandate to impose other penalties.03 These penalties may
be imposed upon any party or on an officer or general manager
of a corporation who refuses to obey an order to answer. They
include:
. . such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and
among others the following:(1) an order that the matters regarding which the questions
were asked... shall be taken to be established for the pur-
puses of the action in accordance with the claim of the
party obtaining the order ;104
(2) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to
support or oppose designated claims or defenses. .. ;105
(3) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or
100. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 510.060 (1) (1949).
101. lbid.
102. ]bid.
103. Mo. Rzv. STAT. § 510.060 (2) (1949). With reference to whether
imposition of these penalties violates due process of law, see Note, 144
A.L.R. 382 (1943).
104. Mo. Ruv. STAT. § 510.060 (2) (1) (1949).
105. Id. § 510.060 (2) (2) (1949).
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staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or
dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof,
or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
party.1°0
ANSWERS AS EVIDENCE
The supreme court of this state has held that the answers to
interrogatories may be utilized as admissions against the party
interrogated, 07 but to be utilized as admissions against the party
interrogated, so far as proof of one's case or defense is con-
cerned, the answers do not become evidence until introduced in
evidence at the trial as admissions against the interest of the
party who has answered the interrogations.1°8 On the other
hand, at least, generally speaking, the answers may not, over
the objection of the party propounding the interrogatories, be
used as evidence in the case by the party who made such an-
swers. 09 So far as the latter is concerned, the answers simply
constitute self-serving statements and, as one court has said,
are "free from the hazards of cross-examination,""10 and save
for exceptional circumstances may not be received in evidence
over one's adversary's objection.' 11
Where, however, an interrogatory has been answered without
objection and the party who filed the interrogatory offers it in
evidence against the party interrogated, the answer should be
admitted in evidence regardless of the fact that it might call
for a conclusion, an opinion, the disclosure of privileged matter,
or the like. So long as the answer is relevant, it should be ad-
mitted in evidence since a failure to object prior to answering
will necessarily operate as a waiver or estop the answering party
106. Id. § 510.060 (2) (3) (1949).
107. State ex Tel. Williams v. Buzard, 354 Mo. 719, 190 S.W.2d 907 (1945).
That the answers are not part of the pleadings, see Dunleer Co. v. Minter
Homes Corp., 33 F. Supp. 242 (S.D.W. Va. 1940). For 'cases in otherjurisdictions treating answers as evidence, see 27 C.J.S., DiscovERY § 67.
108. United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D. Ill. 1942);
Coca Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 275 (D. Md.
1939). See Bowles v. Safeway Stores, 4 F.R.D. 469, 470 (W.D. Mo. 1945).
109. F. & M. Skirt Co. v. A. Wimpfheimer & Bro., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 898(D. Mass. 1939). See In e Shinoe's Estate, 312 Wis. 481, 485, 250 N.W.
505, 507 (1933).
110. Bailey v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 F.R.D. 494 (S.D. Cal.
1940).
111. F. & M. Skirt Co. v. A. Wimpfhehner & Bro., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 898(D. Mass. 1939).
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from later raising an objection on a ground which existed as
the basis for an objection when the interrogatory was answered
by him.112
OBJECTIONS
As already indicated, the party upon whom interrogatories
are served must either answer or, should he feel that he is not
legally bound to answer, object. If, however, an objection is to
be made, the objection must be presented to the court by the
party interrogated, within ten days after he has been served,
together with notice as in case of a motion to the proponent of
the interrogatories, and the party upon whom the interrogatories
were served is expressly authorized by statute to defer the an-
swers to such individual interrogatories as he has objected to
until his objections have been determined by the court."23 In
addition, the court is commanded to determine such objections
"at as early a time as is practicable," or if that is not the mean-
ing of the statute, the objecting party should have the court pass
upon the objections as soon as practicable. It would, therefore,
appear that the primary duty of securing a prompt ruling upon
an objection is either placed upon the court or the objecting
party, but there is no reason why the party who filed the inter-
rogatories may not also ask the court to rule upon the propriety
of any question to which he has properly objected. In fact, the
statute indicates an intention that all objections are to be dis-
posed of promptly, and perhaps the code should have also pro-
vided that the failure of the objecting party to procure the
court's determination within a specified period of time would
automatically operate as an adjudication that the objections
were overruled.
The objections which a party shall make should, of course, be
specific 14 and in writing and with appropriate reasons assigned
for not making answer. In other words, an objection should be
sufficiently specific that the court is able to ascertain promptly
the objectionable character of the questioned interrogation, since
general objections will usually be considered unavailing. 1 More-
112. Kennedy v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 7 F.R.D. 78 (W.D.
Pa. 1947).
113. Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.020 (3) (1949).
114. Boysell v. Hall, 30 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Tenn. 1939).
115. See Boone v. Southern Ry., 9 F.R.D. 60 (E.D. Pa. 1949), where the
objection that the propounded interrogatories as such would cause annoy-
ance, expense and oppression to the defendant without serving any relevant
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over, the burden of establishing the validity or sufficiency of an
objection rests upon the party interrogated and not upon the pro-
pounder of the interrogatories,",, and "in case of doubt," one
court has taken the view that they "should be answered."' T
VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Obviously, interrogatories may be propounded to one's ad-
versary, which, if answered, will force disclosures in violation
of rights protected by certain provisions of the state and federal
constitutions. This is particularly true with reference to the
guarantees against unlawful searches, of due process of law, and
of freedom from self-incrimination, although it must always be
remembered that, in order to assure protection from an inter-
rogatory which seeks to compel the disclosure of any matter in
violation of constitutional guarantees, a party must object and
not answer to the merits.
In this connection, the court will not compel a party to accuse
himself of a crime.1" 8 And as elsewhere pointed out,"1 9 the
observation has been made by one federal district court that if
the number of interrogatories is too numerous and concerned
with minor evidential details, the Fifth Amendment possibly
might be contravened by requiring a party, prior to an adjudi-
cation of liability, to incur expense greater than that ordinarily
incident to the prosecution or defense of a suit.220 But, accord-
ing to the Supreme Court of Missouri, a plaintiff may properly
ask the defendant for the names and addresses of persons ob-
tained by the latter at the scene of the casualty, as well as the
names and addresses of persons who the defendant knew were
purpose was held too general. Also see Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,
10 F.R.D. 477 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Bowles v. Safeway Stores, 4 F.R.D. 469
(W.D. Mo. 1945). It has been further stated in Ridge, Discovery Under
Federal Rvles, 6 J. OF Mo. BAR 121 (1950):
I understand that, under Missouri practice, general objections are per-
mitted to be made to a whole group of interrogatories and that if they
are numerous in number the courts will require parties to resort to taking
depositions. Such is not the practice under the Federal Rules. General
objections to interrogatories in Federal Court are not permissible.
Id. at 162.
116. Bowles v. Safeway Stores, 4 F.R.D. 469 (W.D. Mo. 1945); Blanc v.
Smith, 3 F.R.D. 182 (W.D. Iowa 1943).
117. May v. Midwest Refining Co., 10 F. Supp. 927 (D. Me. 1935).
118. H. Wagner & Adler Co., v. Mali, F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1935); Marsh
v. Marsh, 16 N.J.Eq. 391 (Ch. 1863). Also see Note, 52 A.L.R. 143 (1928).
119. See text supporting note 26 supra.
120. Byers Theaters v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D. 286 (W.D. Va. 1940).
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present at the time and place of the accident, as such interroga-
tories, if answered, will not deprive the defendant of its property
without due process of law nor subject it to an unlawful search
and seizure in contravention of the state and federal constitu-
tions.121 In so concluding with reference to the propounded inter-
rogatories, the court held "'that when a party seeks relief in a
court of law, he must be held to have waived any privilege, which
he otherwise might have had, to withhold testimony required by
the rules of pleading or evidence as a basis for such relief' ,,122
and that "'the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment was not intended to interfere with the power of courts to
compel, through a subpoena duces tecum, the production, upon
trial in court, of documentary evidence; and an order for the
production of books and papers which limits the examination of
such matters as are pertinent to the issues, does not infringe
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure.' ,23 "The right," said the court, "of discovery is too
ancient and has had too long a history in its development in
equity to be questioned now on such constitutional grounds.''
The court then specifically held that these principles or rules
"apply to interrogatories."
CONCLUSION
On several occasions, the writer has, in the conduct of liti-
gation, propounded written interrogatories to the adverse party.
Out of that experience, together with conclusions reached as a
result of the present study, the observation seems fully justi-
fiable that written interrogatories will generally constitute a
reasonably effective and satisfactory device for obtaining pre-
trial disclosure of relevant and material facts from one's oppo-
nent in a law suit. But the device is not, as has been stated
elsewhere with reference to several matters, without defect nor
always wholly satisfactory.
121. State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Cowan, 356 Mo. 674,
203 S.W.2d 407 (1947).
122. Id. at 680, 203 S.W.2d at 410. The court in State ex rel. Kansas
City Public Service Co. v. Cowan, suprt note 121, was in turn quoting from
Fleming v. Bernardi, 1 F.R.D. 624, 625 (N.D. Ohio 1941).
123. State ez '1. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Cowan, 356 Mo. 674,
680, 203 S.W.2d 407, 410 (1947). This above quotation was taken by the
court from 47 AM. Jun., SAwCHEs AxD SEizuRs, § 58.
124. State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Cowan, 356 Mo. 674,
680, 203 S.W.2d 407, 410 (1947).
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Written interrogatories, for one thing, would be much more
useful if they could be used in the state courts with the same
latitude as they may be used in the federal courts under the
federal rule relating to this method of discovery. Actually, there
is little reason for not according written interrogatories the
same scope that they have under the federal rule, and especially
in view of the fact that depositions are used in this state by
lawyers, with general acquiescence, as a "dragnet for a fishing
expedition" to obtain information often not competent as evi-
dence in the pending case. 25 Furthermore, some trial courts are
inclined to be too strict about the form of the individual inter-
rogatories and require the questions to be framed with more
technical perfection than is generally required in written deposi-
tions or during the examination of witnesses at the trial itself.
As a result, the adverse party will often escape answering ques-
tions which as a matter of fair play should be answered.
All the blame, however, cannot be placed upon the courts for
the things which tend to destroy the usefulness of interroga-
tories in Missouri. Lawyers must take some of the responsibility.
Thus, too often, they will subject the propounded questions to
such strict interpretation that the resultant answers are evasive
in effect although technically complete and to the point. Some-
times such care and deliberation are exercised by the attorney in
preparing the answers that the propounder wonders why he did
not take depositions instead of propoundink interrogatories in
order to have been able to secure relatively spontaneous answers.
Sometimes lawyers will fail to answer the interrogatories within
the time specified by the code, and frequently no answer will be
made until the interrogator asks the court for an order to com-
pel the adverse party to answer. Thereupon, the court will, if
requested by the party in default, grant further time within
which the answers may be filed, and rarely, if ever, impose a
penalty.
Many of the weaknesses of written interrogatories as a means
of pre-trial discovery under the Missouri civil code can be over-
come if the courts and attorneys would merely act more in accord
with the basic underlying purpose of the code "to simplify and
liberalize procedure, to the end that litigation shall be expedited
125. State ex Tel. Thompson v. Harris, 355 Mo. 176, 179, 195 S.W.2d 645,
647 (1946).
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with a minimum of technical procedural hindrance.122 An atti-
tude duly considerate of this underlying purpose would bring
the idealistic purpose of pre-trial discovery closer to reality and
even with very little alteration of the present statutory language
make the way "clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for
the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues
and facts before trial" so that civil trials in Missouri, need not
only no longer "be carried on in the dark,"'127 but not even in.
the twilight.
126. John A. Moore & Co. v. McConkey, 240 Mo. App. 198, 203, 203
S.W.2d 512, 514 (1947).
127. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
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